The effects of upcoding, cream skimming and readmissions on the Italian hospitals efficiency: a population–based investigation by Berta, P et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The effects of upcoding, cream skimming
and readmissions on the Italian hospitals
efficiency: a population–based
investigation
P Berta and G Callea and G Martini and G Vittadini
Crisp University of Milan Bicocca, University of Bergamo
21. June 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/17671/
MPRA Paper No. 17671, posted 6. October 2009 09:17 UTC
The Effects of Upcoding, Cream Skimming
and Readmissions on the Italian Hospitals
Efficiency: a Population–based Investigation
Paolo Berta†, Giuditta Callea§∗, Gianmaria Martini§ and Giorgio Vittadini†
June 2009
†CRISP, University of Milan Bicocca, Department of Quantitative Methods, Italy, §University of
Bergamo, Department of Economics and Technology Management, Italy
Abstract
In this paper we analyze the effects of some distortions induced by
prospective payment system, i.e. Upcoding, Cream Skimming and
Readmissions on hospitals’ technical efficiency. We estimate a produc-
tion function using a population–based dataset composed by all active
hospitals in an Italian region, Lombardy, during the period 1998–2007.
We show that cream skimming and upcoding have a negative impact
on hospitals’ technical efficiency, while readmissions have a positive
effect. Moreover, we find that private hospitals are more engaged in
cream skimming than public and not–for–profit ones, while we observe
no ownership differences regarding upcoding. Not–for–profit hospitals
have the highest readmission index. Last, not–for–profit and public
hospitals have the same efficiency levels, while private hospitals have
the lowest technical efficiency.
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1 Introduction
In many industrialized countries, the Prospective Payment System (PPS) is a
pillar of the health care sector. Under PPS hospitals receive a pre–determined
rate for each admission. Each patient is classified into a Diagnosis Related
Group (DRG) according to the clinical information reported in the Hospital
Discharge Chart (HDC). The PPS has been adopted, in place of incurred
cost reimbursement, to improve the sector’s efficiency by introducing financial
incentives aimed at encouraging a more cost-efficient management of medical
care.1 However, under this reimbursement scheme, the hospitals’ managers
have also the incentives to adopt some opportunistic practices (Barbetta et
al. (2007), p. 82), which, in turn, may affect hospitals’ technical efficiency.
The literature has provided several theoretical contributions on these dis-
tortions (e.g. Ellis (1998), Barros (2003)), but little evidence is available on
their magnitude and on their effect on hospitals’ technical efficiency. This
paper is an attempt to fill this gap, by targeting three goals: first, we develop
an econometric analysis to investigate how these distortions influence hospi-
tals’ production function. Second we investigate whether private, not–for–
profit and public hospitals exhibit behavioral differences on these distortions.
Last, we analyze, having taken into account the impact of the distortions on
the production frontier, whether there is a difference in technical efficiency
among public, not–for–profit and private hospitals. To achieve these goals,
we design some indices for computing the magnitude of each distortion at
the hospital level.
In this contribution we focus on three distortions: upcoding, cream skim-
ming and readmissions. The upcoding practice consists in classifying a pa-
1As stated by Barbetta et al. (2007), many contributions, especially those investigating
the US market, point out that a reimbursement system based on incurred costs does not
provide incentives to both cost containment and price competition among hospitals.
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tient in a DRG that produces a higher reimbursement.2 Several definitions
of cream skimming in the health care sector are available in literature. El-
lis (1998) points out that cream skimming consists in the selection of the
more lucrative patients;3 Levaggi and Montefiori (2003) distinguish between
cream skimming as treatment selection (i.e. “horizontal” cream skimming)
and cream skimming as patient selection within the same ailment group (i.e.
“vertical” cream skimming). Under the first practice, the hospital chooses
to provide only the more lucrative and less severe treatments. Given the
features of our dataset, we focus only on the horizontal definition of cream
skimming, i.e. treatment cream skimming. Last, the readmission practice
implies that the same patient is discharged and admitted again after a short
period, so that the hospital receives for the same treatment more than one
reimbursement.
Our investigation revealed several significant empirical results. First, we
show that upcoding and cream skimming have a negative impact on the
hospitals’ output, hence decreasing their overall production frontier. Fur-
thermore, readmissions have a positive impact, implying that those hospitals
more engaged in this practice have a higher output. However this increase
in the total number of treatments might be due to an opportunistic man-
agerial behaviour and not to an efficiency effect. Second, we find evidence
that, differently from previous investigations (e.g. Zuckerman et al. (1994),
2Simborg (1981) defines upcoding or “DRG creep” as a “deliberate and systematic shift
in a hospitals reported case–mix to improve reimbursement” by changing the order of the
principal and secondary diagnoses.
3Ellis (1998) highlights that payment incentives influence both the intensity of services
and the patients who are treated. Moreover he identifies three strategies that providers
may adopt in response to PPS: “creaming”, “skimping” and “dumping”. The former
strategy is defined as the “over–provision of services to low severity patients”; skimping is
instead the “under–provision of services to high severity patients”; dumping is the “explicit
avoidance of high severity patients”.
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Vitaliano and Toren (1996), Puig–Junoy (1998), Sloan (2000), Barbetta et
al. (2007)), not–for–profit hospitals exhibit the same level of technical effi-
ciency than public ones, while private hospitals are less efficient (even if we
observe that they tend to converge to the efficiency of the other two types
at the end of the observed period). Third, private hospitals are involved in
cream skimming at a much higher rate than public and not–for–profit ones.
Fourth, there is no ownership difference in upcoding, while the use of this
distortion is increasing during the period of investigation across all hospital’s
types. Fifth, not–for–profit hospitals show the highest adoption of readmis-
sion practice. Last, the regional technical efficiency has an increasing trend
during 1998–2007.
We achieve these results by applying an econometric analysis to a bal-
anced panel consisting of the entire population of 134 Italian hospitals active
in the Lombardy Region during the period of 1998–2007.4 In Italy health
care is managed at a regional level, and many differences exist across regions.
In this paper the analysis of the distortions’ impact on hospitals’ technical
efficiency has been applied to the wealthiest and most populated Italian re-
gion.5
We run our analysis on a comprehensive dataset based on administrative
data, which covers the main inputs and outputs at hospital level for the en-
tire regional population. Hence we are able to estimate a hospital production
function, and to measure its efficiency by computing the deviation from the
maximum achievable target (i.e. its efficiency score). We adopt stochastic
frontier models and, in order to test the robustness of our results to different
4Lombardy has 9.5 million inhabitants (16% of the total) and produces 25% of the
Italian GDP.
5The Italian National Health Service (NHS) is controlled by two levels of public author-
ities: the National Government, who states the main guidelines of the health care sector;
the Regions, which have the responsibility for the local organization and administration
of the health care sector.
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model specifications, we estimate a production function under two functional
forms and two econometric models. Concerning the functional specification,
we consider both a Cobb Douglas and a Translog production function. Cobb
Douglas form involves a smaller number of parameters to estimate (hence
reducing the risk of near–multicollinearity) but imposes a constant elastic-
ity of input substitution. Translog form does not impose any technological
restriction and therefore is very flexible.
Regarding the econometric models, we consider the Random Effects Model
(henceforth RE) proposed by Pitt and Lee (1981) and the True Random Ef-
fects Model (henceforth TRE) developed by Greene (2005a, 2005b). The
former model estimates a time invariant efficiency level for each hospital.
Hence it does not consider whether a hospital has became more or less ef-
ficient during the period of analysis. In the TRE model, efficiency is not
constant over time and it is possible to distinguish it from latent hospital
heterogeneity.
Our work is linked to a limited number of investigations that have stud-
ied the adoption of PPS induced distortions by different hospitals’ ownership
forms. Silverman and Skinner (2004) try to estimate whether the use of up-
coding is influenced by the type of hospital ownership in US hospitals. They
consider only four DRGs and show that upcoding is higher in private hos-
pitals. Dafny (2005) finds instead that US hospitals respond to changes in
the DRG tariffs primarily by upcoding patients. The analysis we perform ex-
pands upon these insights in several ways. First, we propose a different proxy
to measure upcoding. Second, we consider all the possible DRG pairs with
and without complications. Third, we expand the scale of previous analyses
by running a population–based investigation, which covers about 20 million
admissions. Fourth, we use data on comorbidity at patient level using the
Elixhauser Index.6 Cutler (1995) finds evidence, only for some DRGs, of a
6In medicine comorbidity describes the presence in a patient of other diseases in ad-
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trend increase in the readmission rate in the US after the introduction of the
PPS. Our contribution extends his analysis by computing the readmission
rate for all the possible DRGs, and by proposing a refinement of the read-
mission’s proxy. Louis et al. (1999) provide evidence of the impact of the
PPS on readmissions in Italy. They show that the introduction of PPS does
not give rise to an increase in readmission rate. However, the proxy they
adopt to compute this distortion may be too wide for medical conditions.
Our contribution, to the best of our knowledge, is the first to estimate the
impact of PPS distortions on hospitals’ technical efficiency.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we show the proxies
adopted to compute the PPS distortions, in Section 3 we present the econo-
metric models. The dataset and the Italian institutional setting are reported
in Section 4, while Section 5 presents both the estimates hospitals’ tech-
nical efficiency and some evidence on the distribution of upcoding, cream
skimming and readmissions according to hospital ownership. Furthermore,
it investigates whether there is a difference in technical efficiency among pub-
lic, not–for–profit and private hospitals. The main conclusions of the paper
are reported in Section 6, which ends up our contribution.
dition to the primary one. Several indexes have been developed to quantify comorbidity
(see de Groot et al. (2003)). The most widely used are the Charlson Comorbidity Index
(see Charlson et al. (1987)) and the Elixhauser Index (see Elixhauser et al. (1998)). They
consider the coded presence of some secondary diagnoses not linked with the principal
one (i.e. the main reason of admission), such as heart attacks, chronic pulmonary disease,
diabetes, cancer, AIDS. The Elixhauser Index (see Elixhauser et al. (1998)) considers a
list of 30 comorbidities, while the Charlson Comorbidity Index is limited only to a list of
17. Recent studies (see Southern et al. (2004)) point out that the Elixhauser comorbidity
measurement outperforms the Charlson model in predicting mortality. We adopt the Co-
morbidity Software, Version 3.3 developed as part of the Healthcare Cost and Utilization
Project (HCUP) by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ (2008)) to
compute the Elixhauser comorbidity.
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2 The PPS induced distortions
As mentioned previously, we focus on three distortions: upcoding, cream
skimming and readmissions. Our first step in the analysis is to design some
proxies to compute them.
2.1 The upcoding index
Concerning upcoding, we can start from the contributions provided by Dafny
(2005) and Silverman and Skinner (2004). Dafny (2005) adopts the following
proxy to compute upcoding: she considers all the DRG pairs with and with-
out complications and defines upcoding as the ratio of hospitals’ discharges
in the DRGs with complications over the total number of discharges in the
DRG pair (i.e. the sum of discharges with and without complications in a
given DRG pair). Her contribution shows that the management changes the
intensity of upcoding in response to variation in the prices reimbursed under
the PPS, but it does not take into account that the total number of dis-
charges with complications may be influenced, on top of upcoding, also by
the patient’s sickness status. If the health status of the population becomes
worse, hospitals may register a higher number of patients with complications.
Silverman and Skinner (2004) do consider the patient’s health status,
but do not disentangle it from the proxy they propose for upcoding. They
study only four DRGs concerning general respiratory ailments, one of which
has a DRG weight much higher than the others because of the presence of
complications. Their proxy for upcoding is given by the ratio of hospital’s
discharges in the DRG with complications and higher DRG weight over the
sum (in the same hospital) of the discharges in all the four DRGs considered.
In order to take into account the patient’s sickness status, Silverman and
Skinner (2004) compare the difference in the hospitals’ trends for upcoding
and patients’ health status, using as a proxy the Charlson Comorbidity Index.
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They observe different trends and, consequently, conclude that the increasing
trend in upcoding is mainly due to opportunistic behaviour.
We believe that, to identify upcoding, it is necessary to disentangle the
share of hospital’s discharges with complications between those due to the
patients’ sickness status and those induced by the opportunistic managerial
behaviour. Only the latter can be classified as upcoding. The Comorbodity
Index (CI, with 0 ≤ CI ≤ 1) is a good indicator of the patient health
status at the time of admission. Hence we define sCit =
yCit
yCit+y
NC
it
as the share
of discharges with complications (yCit ) over the total discharges in a specific
DRG (yCit + y
NC
it ) in hospital i at time t;
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This share is then compared with the same share but computed at the
regional level, i.e. sCt . The ratio
sCit
sCt
shows whether hospital i at period t
is treating more complicated cases than the regional average (the ratio is
greater than 1) or not. Furthermore we divide this ratio by the comorbidity
index CIit (computed using the Elixhauser Index (1998)); the result is as
proxy of the hospital’s upcoding activity.8 This implies the following index
for upcoding:
UPCODit =
sCit
sCt
× 1
CIkit
(1)
7Version 19th (14th) of the Grouper software (the application produced by 3M and
adopted to assign the DRG to each discharge) identifies 118 (112) pairs of DRGs with and
without complications. Hence upcoding is a distortion that may only arise in only 236
DRGs out of about 500.
8As an example, let us suppose that hospital i has s
C
it
sCt
= 1.5, as well as hospital j.
Furthermore, CIi = 0.5, i.e. in hospital i the comorbidity index is equal to 50%, which
means that half of the patients are admitted with long–term health problems. Then from
(1) hospital i upcoding activity is equal to 3. On the contrary, CIj = 0.8, i.e. in hospital j
80% of the patients have health problems. Hospital j upcoding activity is equal to 1.875.
The two hospitals have the same number of complicated cases but the former makes 60%
more upcoding than the latter.
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2.2 The treatment cream skimming index
The literature does not provide, to the best of our knowledge, any attempts
to estimate the treatment cream skimming. Hence what we present below
should be considered as a first attempt to compute it. As mentioned before,
with this distortion the management chooses the treatments to provide. In
order to compute it, we assume that the opportunistic behaviour (which is
unobservable) is less likely the higher the number of DRGs per ward provided
by an hospital. If hospital i has the same number of wards than hospital j
but less DRGs per ward, it is likely that treatment selection is occurring, i.e.
hospital i is focusing on some DRGs. Hence our cream skimming index is
given by the following expression:9
CRSKit =

1 if NDRGit
NWARDit
≥
(
NDRGt
NWARDt
)
90
2 if
(
NDRGt
NWARDt
)
10
< NDRGit
NWARDit
<
(
NDRGt
NWARDt
)
90
3 if NDRGit
NWARDit
≤
(
NDRGt
NWARDt
)
10
(2)
where NDRGit is the total number of DRGs with more than 10 discharges
during a year treated in hospital i at time t,10 and NWARDit represents the
total number of wards in hospital i at time t and
(
NDRGt
NWARDt
)
q
is the qth per-
centile of the regional distribution of the ratio between these two indicators
in period t (with q = {10, 90}). The ratio between the number of DRGs and
wards takes into account the relationship between the breadth of the hospi-
tal’s inpatient activity and the hospital size. The higher the ratio, the less
treatment cream skimming is observed in the hospital. The underlying idea is
9The proposed specification has been designed after several interviews performed with
regional health officers in charge of the PPS.
10In order to reduce the risk of underestimating cream skimming in a specific hospital
we consider only the usual hospital activity, and so we rule out the DRGs only occasionally
treated, i.e. those few discharges on a specific DRG that are treated only under exceptional
circumstances. The threshold has been fixed at 10 discharges per year.
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that the lower the number of DRGs treated per ward in a hospital, the more
specialized the hospital is. However, a high value of CRSKit may be due
both to health services concentration and to the selection of the more lucra-
tive activities. To distinguish these effects we compare the hospital’s number
of DRGs per ward with the regional distribution of the same ratio. Hence,
we design two dummy variables which identify hospitals with a high degree
of cream skimming, i.e. hospitals with CRSKH = 1 and hospitals showing a
medium degree of cream skimming, i.e. hospitals with CRSKM = 2.
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2.3 The readmission index
In this case the opportunistic behaviour consists in readmitting a patient
after a short time in order to get further reimbursements. Cutler (1995), that
analyzes the impact on the patient’s sickness status after the introduction
of PPS in the US of some variables related with the treatments provided by
the hospitals, computes it as the number of discharges in the same hospital
during a year. However, since this proxy is computed at hospital level, it may
include a readmission due to a different disease from the initial one, which
cannot be classified as a distortion.
We believe that two features have to be present for a readmission being
classified as the result of a managerial opportunistic behaviour: (1) the read-
mission has to be for the same disease of the initial admission; (2) it should
occur quite shortly after the first discharge. Hence the proxy we adopt for
readmission is the following one:
READMit =
yit,∆
yit
(3)
where yit,∆ represents the total number of readmissions in the same hospital
11We have also run the analysis shown in Section 5 with a continuous index of cream
skimming, and we have found no difference in the results.
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for the same Major Diagnostic Category (MDC) and within ∆ days from the
date of the initial discharge, while yit is the total number of admissions in
hospital i at time t.
In Section 5 we will provide some descriptive evidence regarding the dis-
tortion indexes presented in this Section, and we will investigate whether
there exist behavioral differences according to the hospital ownership types.
3 The estimation of technical efficiency
Efficiency is a concept related with measuring the performance of a pro-
ductive unit. The latter may be investigated under two perspectives: (1)
whether the unit is not wasting resources, i.e. it is producing the maximum
feasible level of output given the amount of inputs involved in the produc-
tion process (technical efficiency); (2) whether the unit is choosing the best
technology given the vector of input prices, i.e. it is minimizing the produc-
tion costs (allocative efficiency). In this paper, given that our dataset covers
information about inputs and outputs and not on factors’ prices, we focus
on technical efficiency. Economic theory underlines that technical efficiency
is linked with a frontier, which is called production function, i.e. the locus
yielding the maximum achievable output for a given set of inputs.
A production frontier may be estimated using parametric methods (e.g.
COLS or Stochastic Frontiers) and non–parametric methods (e.g. Data En-
velopment Analysis–DEA). DEA methods are linear programming techniques
with two major drawbacks: they do not allow for statistical inference and
they do not specify a functional form mapping the relation between inputs
and outputs. COLS is a parametric method which does not distinguish be-
tween inefficiency and random disturbances. This distinction is instead pos-
sible with Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA).
Since the original contribution of Aigner et al. (1977), SFA has been
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widely applied to measure hospitals’ efficiency.12 However this is the first
attempt to identify the impact of some PPS induced distortions on hospi-
tal’s production. In order to investigate the hospitals’ technical efficiency
we perform a two–steps analysis: first, we estimate a stochastic frontier and
identify the impact of the distortions on the hospitals’ output. Second, we
investigate whether the estimated efficiency scores depend upon the different
ownership types, i.e. we want to assess if there is an efficiency gap among
private, not–for–profit and public hospitals. This target is achieved by test-
ing whether there exists a significant difference among the mean efficiency
scores of the different hospital types.
We estimate a stochastic frontier by applying two econometric methods:
a RE model with time invariant efficiency scores (Pitt and Lee (1981)) and
a TRE model with time variant efficiency scores (Greene (2005a, 2005b)),
which allows also to disentangle hospitals’ heterogeneity and relative effi-
ciency. Under the RE stochastic frontier model we estimate the following
equation:
yit = α+ βxit + vit − ui (4)
where i indicates hospital i and t = 1,...,T denotes the year. The dependent
variable yit is the observed output of hospital i in period t, α is a constant, β a
vector of parameters and xit an observed vector of covariates for hospital i in
period t. The error term is split into two components: the term vit represents
the white noise residuals, while the term ui represents the hospitals’ ineffi-
ciency score—which is constant during the period of investigation—and has
to be estimated by the model. The error component vit is a two–sided distur-
bance capturing the effect of noise, while the error component ui (ui ≥ 0) is
a one–sided non negative and normally distributed disturbance reflecting the
12For a review of studies using stochastic frontier analysis in the health care sector see
Hollingsworth (2003) and Rosko and Mutter (2007).
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effect of inefficiency. The model is estimable by maximizing the log–likelihood
function of the half normal stochastic frontier (see Greene (2005b), p. 283).
When we apply the TRE model we estimate the following function:
yit = α+ βxit + wi + vit − uit (5)
where wi is hospital i’s specific unobserved random effect (with normal
distribution)—the heterogeneity effect—vit is the white noise error term and
uit ≥ 0 is hospital i’s time varying inefficiency (with half normal distribu-
tion). The model is estimable by maximum simulated likelihood (see Greene
(2005b), p. 288).
The variables we consider to estimate hospitals’ efficiency are shown in
Table 1. The hospitals’ output is the dependent variable. Following Cleverley
(2002), we consider the number of discharges adjusted both for case–mix and
for the weight of day–care and outpatient activities on the overall hospital
activity.13 Hence the hospital output is given by the following expression:
y∗it = y
IN
it ×
(
1 +
RDCit +R
OUT
it
RINit
)
× AW INit (6)
with y∗it being the total number of discharges case–mix adjusted, y
IN
it the
total number of inpatient discharges, RDCit the day–care revenues, R
OUT
it the
outpatient revenues, RINit the inpatient revenues and AWit the average DRG
weight for inpatient activity of hospital i at time t.
[Table 1 here]
13The available dataset does not split the personnel utilization among inpatient, day–
care and outpatient activities. Hence it is necessary to consider an output that aggregates
all the hospital’s activites. Furthermore, during the observed period day–care and outpa-
tient activities have grown consistently; hence it is necessary to consider their weight in
the overall hospital output.
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The input variables concern beds (BEDS), hospital staff divided among
physicians (PHY S), nurses (NURS) and administrative staff (ADM).14
Moreover, we include some distinctive hospital features, such as the presence
of an emergency department (the dummy EMERG = 1 if the department
is present), the concentration of health services in the treatment of only one
pathology (the dummyMONO = 1 for cardiological, neurological, oncologic
and orthopaedic hospitals), the presence of a University within the hospital
(the dummy TEACH = 1 if the hospital has a university teaching status)
and the management of more than one hospital under the same authority (the
dummy GROUP = 1 if the hospital belongs to a group). The distribution of
these variables in our sample is described in the next Section. Furthermore,
we consider the three distortions described before, i.e. upcoding (UPCOD),
cream skimming (CRSKH and CRSKM) and readmissions (READM), and
a time variable T representing the linear trend in technological progress.15
Once we have estimated the hospitals’ efficiency score (which is time in-
variant in the RE model and time variant in the TRE one), we take into
account, as pointed out by previous contributions in literature (e.g. Barbetta
et al. (2007), Dafny (2005) and Silverman and Skinner (2004)), the impact
of ownership on efficiency. Following Singh and Coelli (2001) we consider
the estimated efficiency scores for public, private and private not–for–profit
hospitals and we apply the Kruskal–Wallis test to check for significant dif-
ferences.
As mentioned previously, we consider two functional forms for the pro-
14All labour variables are computed as full time equivalent employees. The information
does not include temporary workers, which may lead to an underestimation of this input,
particularly in private hospitals.
15Concerning the variable READM , the estimation has been performed with ∆=45
following the suggestions of the regional health care officers. In Lombardy Region, since
1998 the regional reimbursement system bears a reduction in the unit reimbursement in
case of a readmission within 45 days.
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duction frontier, a Cobb Douglas model and a Translog model. Under the
Cobb Douglas model, the equation we estimate is as follows:
log(y∗it) = α+
4∑
j=1
βjlog(xjit) +
4∑
l=1
γlzlit +
4∑
k=1
δkdkit + ξT (7)
where xjit is the input j (i.e. beds, physicians, nurses and administrative
staff) in hospital i at period t, zlit is the characteristic l (i.e. the dummies
for the presence of an emergency department, of a mono–specialistic activity,
of a teaching activity and of belonging to a group) in hospital i at period
t, dkit is the level of distortion k (i.e. upcoding, the two dummies for cream
skimming and readmissions) in hospital i at period t and T is the time trend.
Furthermore, we also adopt a translog functional form (see Christensen
et al. (1973)) for the production function, and in this case the model we
estimate is the following one:
log(y∗it) = α+
4∑
j=1
βjlog(xjit) +
1
2
4∑
j=1
4∑
h=1
βjhlog(xjit)log(xhit)+
+
4∑
l=1
γlzlit +
4∑
k=1
δkdkit + ξT
(8)
where, differently from the Cobb Douglas functional form displayed in ex-
pression (7), we also estimate both the possible interactions between the
hospital’s inputs and their second order effects. The results will be displayed
in Section 5.
4 The dataset
We investigate a large administrative dataset covering the full population of
patients and hospitals operating in the Lombardy Region, with over 20,000,000
admissions, between 1998 and 2007. Since our information come from ad-
ministrative data we can analyze our research questions over the entire pop-
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ulation and not only over a sample; hence we do not incur in the sample
selection error component (Imai et al. (2008)).
The data are provided by the Health Care Department of the Lom-
bardy Region. We extracted the data concerning all the Hospital Discharge
Charts, which include information regarding the patient (gender, age, resi-
dence), the hospital (regional code) and the admission (DRG, length of stay,
principal and secondary diagnosis—from which comorbidity is computed—,
principal and secondary procedures). This dataset has been linked with an-
other database—always provided by the Lombard Health Care Department—
regarding all the hospital’s features (beds, physicians, nurses, ownership,
presence of emergency unit, etc.).16
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics concerning the whole dataset.
The total number of discharges adjusted for case–mix and for hospital activi-
ties (i.e. y∗it as defined in (6)) has increased during the period (+31%), as well
as the case–mix index (CMI +21%); on the contrary we observe a decrease
both in the days of stay (DAY S, -24%), in the average length of stay (ALOS,
-15%) and in the total number of discharges (DISCH, -12%). This evidence
is consistent with the insights reported in literature concerning some general
effects of the introduction of PPS (i.e. a reduction in ALOS and number
of discharges, compensated by an increase in the day–care and outpatient
treatments). Furthermore, we observe an increase in the case–mix and also a
worsening of the patient health status: the comorbidity index (COMORB)
increases by 28% during the period. Regarding inputs, the total number of
beds decreased over the period (-17%), showing that the system was running
in over–capacity at the beginning of the period. Among the staff, nurses are
the only staff category with a small decrease over the period (-1%), while
16Information are recorded in Access. The data are not public under Italian privacy law.
The Health Care Department of the Lombardy Region may be contacted for discussing
the provision of the data with the aim of scientific publications.
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physicians show a robust increase (+11%). A small increase (+2%) is ob-
served for administrative staff. Italian hospitals have mainly expanded the
employment of physicians.
[Table 2 here]
In 2007 an emergency unit was active in 65% of hospital, while only 6% of
them can be classified as mono–specialistic organization. Academics activity
was also performed by 10% of the hospitals and 60% of them are part of a
group.
In the dataset, about 54% of the 134 hospitals active in Lombardy are
public (72), while about 34% are private (46). The remaining 12% is given by
not–for–profit organizations (16). 17 The ownership distribution is constant
over the period, showing that no mergers and acquisitions among hospitals
(which are a frequent event in the US)18 are planned in Italy. The not–
for–profit hospitals are concentrated in the Milan county (60% of the total
not–for–profit ones); other hospitals of this ownership type are in the Como
county (20%), in Pavia (13%) and Brescia (7%). In the other Lombard coun-
ties there are no not–for–profit hospitals. Private hospitals are instead active
in all the Lombardy counties, as well as the public ones. The distribution
of private and public hospitals across the counties follows the population
distribution.
17We follow the classification adopted by Barbetta et al. (2007), and consider as public
both Aziende Ospedaliere (hospital enterprises) and Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere
Scientifico Pubblici (public research hospitals); we classify as not–for–profit hospitals both
Istituti di Ricovero e Cura a Carattere Scientifico Privati (private research hospitals) and
Ospedali Classificati (hospitals run by religious bodies); private hospitals are the private
accredited ones. As stated by Sloan (2000), the main distinction between private and
not–for–profit organization lies in the distribution of accounting profits. The latter do not
distribute such profit. Public hospital are controlled by the regional or local governments.
18See Krishnan (2001) and Vita and Sacher (2001)
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[Table 3 here]
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics regarding only the public hospi-
tals active in Lombardy during the observed period. Furthermore, Tables 4–5
display the same data for, respectively, not–for–profit and private hospitals.
It is interesting to point out that, while in 1998 public (private) hospitals
produced the highest (lowest) level of case–mix and activity–mix adjusted
output, at the end of the period not–for–profit hospitals registered the high-
est output level (while private hospitals have always the lowest). This swap
is not observed if we focus on discharges; not–for–profit hospitals have the
highest case–mix index both at the beginning and at the end of the period,
while private ones have always the lowest. Not–for–profit hospitals have also
the highest comorbidity index; public hospitals have an higher comorbidity
index than private ones in 2007.
If we look at inputs, we observe that while public hospitals have the
highest number of beds and of physicians in 1998, not–for–profit ones register
the highest inputs’ levels in 2007. Private hospitals have always the lowest
number of beds and physicians. The largest number of nurses is always
observed in public hospital, as well as administrative staff. Private hospitals
have always the lowest employment level.
[Table 4 here]
[Table 5 here]
Table 6 displays the inputs Pearson correlation index for ownership type.
While there is a high positive correlation between beds and the different
staff types (and among the number of physicians, nurses and administrative
staff) in not–for–profit and public hospitals, the correlation between beds
and physicians is only 0.69 in private ones. The correlation between beds
and nurses is 0.83 in private hospitals, and between beds and administrative
17
staff is only 0.78. Moreover the correlation indices among staff are always
lower than those observed in the other two hospital types. All these data
suggest that private not–for-profit hospitals are very similar to public ones,
while private hospitals are smaller and with a lower ratio employment/beds.
[Table 6 here]
5 Results
In this Section we present the results of the empirical analysis. We split the
evidence in two parts. First (5.1) we display some descriptive statistics about
the distribution of the three distortions for ownership type. Second (5.2), we
present the estimates of the efficient frontier and the impact of the distortions
on hospitals’ output and we test whether there exists an ownership ranking
according to the estimated efficiency scores.19
5.1 The distribution of PPS across hospitals with different own-
ership
We now present some empirical evidence concerning the distribution of the
three PPS distortions in not–for–profit, private and public hospitals, and
their dynamics over the observed period. Figure 1 shows the dynamic of the
distortions between 1998 and 2007 in the three different hospital ownership
types. Each picture displays the yearly average distortion per ownership
type.20
19The estimation has been performed using the econometric software Limdep 9 and the
statistical package SAS.
20The time spell for the upcoding distortion is reduced to the period 2000–2007 because
the method to compute the comorbidity index changed in 2000 after the introduction of
the 14th version of the DRG Grouper, and this modification does not allow to compare
the statistics for 1998–1999 with the remaining years.
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[Figure 1 here]
It is evident that the behaviour of the three hospital types regarding
the distortions is heterogeneous.21 The three hospital types demonstrate
a rather uniform behaviour concerning upcoding, differently from Silverman
and Skinner (2004) and Dafny (2005), who reported a higher upcoding activ-
ity in private hospitals. In our dataset private hospitals were more engaged in
this practice only during the period 2003–2005. In the remaining years their
behaviour was similar to that of the other hospitals. Moreover, we observe
an increasing trend in this distortion and a convergence among the different
ownership types during the period of investigation.22
The index for treatment cream skimming is much higher for private hos-
pitals, while this distortion is small in not–for–profit and public hospitals.
Moreover, the convergence between the two latter types seems to increase
with time and their activity concerning this distortion seems to decrease.
This new insight confirms some expectations among the profession (i.e. pri-
vate hospitals do select the treatments), but it is the first attempt to quantify
them. Another interesting result is that not–for–profit and public hospitals
exhibit the same very low level of treatment cream skimming.23
Figure 1 also shows the general trend for the readmission distortion.
All the indices decrease over the period. Not–for–profit hospitals produce
a higher distortion, while the private ones show the lowest level. We provide
21We have performed Kruskal–Wallis tests for difference in the mean, which confirm the
behavioral distinctions reported here.
22The spike observed for private hospitals in 2003 is due to a change in the reimbursement
method that may have allowed an higher upcoding activity during that year. More severe
checks implemented after 2003 by regional health officers have limited this chance.
23This evidence is different from Sloan (2000), which argues that for–profit and not–
for–profit hospitals are far more alike than different. It is closer to Silverman and Skinner
(2004), and the difference between for–profit and not–for–profit hospitals may be due to
the presence of altruism (Newhouse (1970)) and vocational purposes.
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two possible explanations for this evidence: (1) More severe controls on the
activity of private hospitals on this distortion, which may be more easily
checked by the regulator than the previous ones. (2) As mentioned pre-
viously, two effects could have an impact on readmissions: reputation and
opportunistic behavior. The reputation effect may be stronger if we con-
sider not–for–profit and public hospitals (see Newhouse (1970), Hansmann
(1980)): they have more readmissions because of a better reputation. The
latter induces a highest share of less healthy patients, which require repeated
and more frequent treatments.
5.2 The estimates of technical efficiency for Italian hospitals
In this Section we present the estimates of efficiency for Italian hospitals and
we observe whether there is a difference according to the ownership types.
As mentioned previously, for each functional form, i.e. Cobb Douglas and
Translog, we estimated two econometric specifications: the RE model and
the TRE model. Moreover, for each functional form and for each econometric
specification, we performed two different regressions including different sets
of covariates: Model 1 considers only input variables, hospital characteristics
(i.e. presence of emergency department, specialization, etc.) and the time
trend, while Model 2 includes also the proxies for the distortions.
The Shapiro and Wilk (1965) normality test on the dependent variable
(i.e. the case–mix, hospital–activity adjusted discharges) shows that there is
no evidence of non–normality of this sample (see Tables 7–8).24 Moreover,
the Levene test shows that the residuals are homoscedastic25. The Durbin–
24The p–values associated with the W statistic are higher than the critical value of 0.01;
thus as stated by Shapiro and Wilk (1965) p. 606, “there is no evidence of non–normality
of this sample”.
25The p–values associated to the Levene statistic are higher than the critical value of
0.01; thus we can accept the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity.
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Watson test reveals a lack of correlation among the residuals.26 Finally, the
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) index for input multicollinearity shows that
inputs are not influenced by multicollinearity.27
[Table 7 here]
[Table 8 here]
The econometric results shown in Tables (9)–(10) are robust to the dif-
ferent specifications, with very few exceptions. In all the models the input
variables are highly significant with positive coefficients, with the exception
of administrative staff under the translog functional form.28
[Table 9 here]
[Table 10 here]
Regarding hospital’s characteristics, the presence of an emergency de-
partment increases the efficiency under both econometric models. In fact,
it seems that, even though hospitals have to assign, for the presence of an
emergency unit, some assets (beds) and labour inputs in order to be able to
respond to the peaks in emergency, they are able to admit more patients, and
often less healthy and more complicated ones. Under these circumstances the
26The Durbin–Watson test signals correlation among the residuals if the statistics as-
sumes values D ≤ 1 or D ≥ 3.
27The VIF indexes are the following: VIF(log(BEDS))=6.53, VIF(log(MED))=8.73
and VIF(log(ADM)=7.31. The rule proposed by Kutner et al. (2004) is that a value of
V IF ≥ 10 is an indication of potential multicollinearity problems.
28The two input variables having the highest impact on the hospitals’ output are the
number of beds and nurses in the Cobb Douglas models, while physicians have the lowest
coefficient. In the RE model the sum of the input coefficients is consistent with increasing
returns to scale, while in the TRE model we observe decreasing returns to scale.
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emergency unit generates an increase in the number of admissions. As ex-
pected, mono–specialistic hospitals are more efficient than pluri–specialist
ones. The presence of academics activity within the hospitals has a negative
impact on the production frontier under the Cobb Douglas functional form,
while there is no statistically significant effect under the translog model. If
more than one hospital is controlled by the same authority production is
lower: analyzed hospitals have some difficulties to deal with multiplant tech-
nologies. The sign of the time variable, capturing the shift in technology,
shows an increase in the production frontier over the observed period.
Table 10 presents the estimated production function for the translog func-
tional form. In general all the previous results are replicated; the second order
and interaction terms are almost completely statistically significant. A neg-
ative coefficient is observed for the interaction between beds and physicians,
physicians and nurses and nurses and administrative staff. A positive inter-
action is instead estimated for beds and nurses, beds and administrative staff
and physicians and administrative staff.
Last, we analyze the impact on hospitals’ efficiency of the three distor-
tions. Upcoding and treatment cream skimming reduce the hospitals ef-
ficiency in all the models. This means that hospitals with high upcoding
either suffer of a Leibenstein X–inefficiency factor since they obtain higher
revenues thanks to the distortions (see Leibenstein (1966)), or they choose to
treat less cases to justify the presence of treatments with high DRG weights.29
Regarding treatment cream skimming, again the possible explanations may
be a Leibenstein X–inefficiency factor and the lower number of discharges
29Leibenstein introduces the theory of inefficiency generated from non–competition. It
may be summarized as follows: “For a variety of reasons people and organisations normally
work neither as hard or as effectively as they could. In situations where competitive
pressure is light, many people will trade the disutility of greater effort, or search for the
utility of feeling less pressure and of better interpersonal relations.” Essentially, there will
be a slack in cost control and in the amount of effort put in by management and workers.
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due to treatment selection (the management chooses to focus the activity
on some treatments but this effect is not compensated by the reduction in
discharges due to the restriction in the DRGs treated).
Readmissions have a strong positive impact on efficiency, because, as
expected, this practice increases the hospital’s output; however, it is likely
that this is due to an opportunistic behaviour (not to an efficiency effect).
These results yield some suggestions for changes to the reimbursement
policies which will be briefly discussed in our conclusion.
We can now analyze the efficiency ranking according to the hospital own-
ership. If we compute the partial productivity measures (see Table 11), i.e.
output per input, we observe that private hospitals have the largest values
for physicians, nurses and administrative staff, while public structures have
the lowest measures. On the contrary, the ranking is the opposite if we con-
sider beds. A more robust analysis can be performed using the estimated
efficiency scores.
[Table 11 here]
Table 12 shows the average estimated efficiency score for public, not–
for–profit and private hospitals under the two econometric models and for
the translog functional form (the same results hold for the Cobb Douglas
function form). We consider the efficiency scores (i.e. Exp(−ui), ui ≥ 0)
estimated using only the inputs as covariates.
Under the RE model—where a time invariant efficiency score is estimated
for each hospital—the average efficiency score of public hospitals is greater
than that for not–for–profit hospitals; the lowest average is for private ones.
Table ?? also displays the Kruskal–Wallis test for statistically significant dif-
ferences in the ownership average efficiency scores. Based on these tests,
the null hypothesis of no difference between the technical efficiency scores of
the two ownership types is investigated. Under the RE model the null hy-
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pothesis is rejected only for public and private hospitals, i.e. public hospitals
are statistically more efficient than private ones. No statistically significant
difference is observed with not–for–profit hospitals.
Hence public hospitals are technically more efficient than private ones,
as shown by Puig–Junoy (1998) for Spanish hospitals and Zuckerman et al.
(1994) for the US ones and differently by Wilson and Jadlow (1982). This
ranking can be explained by considering the estimated input coefficients,
the partial productivity measures and the inputs correlation across owner-
ship types. Private hospitals have the lowest partial productivity measure
for beds, which is the input with the largest coefficient in the estimated
production frontier. For these reasons they have the lowest ranking in tech-
nical efficiency. If we consider that private hospitals exhibit also the lowest
correlation between beds and personnel, this implies that they employ less
physicians, nurses and administrative staff per beds. In this way private
hospitals probably reduce labor costs.
If we consider the TRE model, where a time–variant efficiency score is
estimated, we can observe if there are differences in the efficiency trends. We
find that at the beginning of the period public and not–for–profit hospitals
are more efficient than private ones. On the contrary, at the end of the period
(year 2007) no significant difference among the average efficiency scores of
the three ownership types is observed (as shown by Vitaliano and Toren
(1996), Sloan (2000) and Barbetta et al. (2007)). Hence the regional system
has became more homogenous according to technical efficiency estimates.
This is probably due to a more stringent regulation, since the fulfillments
required in order to be part of the mixed health care regional system have
been tightened over the period.
[Table 12 here]
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6 Conclusions
This paper provides some indices to measure three typical PPS distortions:
upcoding, treatment cream skimming and readmissions. Moreover, these dis-
tortions are introduced as covariates to investigate the efficiency of hospitals
in Lombardy.
The main results are the following. First, readmissions are the most
relevant distortion, since they significantly increase hospitals’ output. Sec-
ond, cream skimming and upcoding have a negative impact on efficiency.
Third, private hospitals are particularly engaged in treatment cream skim-
ming, while this distortion is very low in public and not–for–profit hospitals.
Fourth, no ownership differences are observed if we look at upcoding (differ-
ently from Silverman and Skinner (2004) and Dafny (2005)), while not–for–
profit hospitals make many more readmissions than public hospitals, and the
private ones have very low indices. Fifth, not–for–profit hospitals and public
hospitals show a similar technical efficiency level, and are more efficient than
private ones.
We can draw some policy implications from the above results. First,
since upcoding and cream skimming have a negative impact on efficiency, the
policy maker may anticipate that hospitals with high upcoding and cream
skimming indices have some spare capacity (e.g. too many beds) or more
personnel than that required under technical efficiency. This inefficient re-
sources’ utilization is due to the management’s decision to specialize in the
most lucrative treatments. Hence we suggest that the policy maker should
use the incentive mechanism in order to try to correct these distortions. One
possibility could be the adoption of a reimbursement scheme where the price
paid for DRGs with complications (which may be affected by upcoding) is
inversely related to the level of the distortion.
Second, hospitals with high readmission index use all the available inputs,
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since readmissions have a positive impact on technical efficiency. However,
they adopt an opportunistic behaviour to increase the total reimbursement.
In this case the policy maker should rise the penalty reduction in the re-
imbursement rate (already implemented in the regional health care service
we analyzed) in case of a readmission occurred in the same hospital, for the
same DRG and shortly after the first admission.
This paper is a first attempt to estimate the impact of some distortions
induced by the PPS on technical efficiency. Further research is needed on
designing better indices to estimate the distortions (and to include others,
e.g. early discharges), and to identify the determinants of the opportunistic
behaviour. Furthermore, it is necessary to extend the analysis to hospital’s
costs and revenues, to identify whether the PPS has achieved the goal of costs
containment and if there a different ranking among the different ownership
structures. Last, different regional systems may be considered, to control for
cross–regional differences.
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Variable category Description Proxy
Hospital Output Case–mix adj discharges y∗it
Hospital Inputs Beds BEDSit
Physicians PHY Sit
Nurses NURSit
Administrative staff ADMit
Ownership Public PUBLit
Not–for–profit NFPit
Hospital characteristics Emergency department EMERGit
Mono–specialistic MONOit
Teaching status TEACHit
Group GROUPit
PPS distortions Upcoding UPCODit
High cream skimming CRSK −Hit
Medium cream skimming CRSK −Medit
Readmissions READMit
Time trend T
Table 1: The variables considered to estimate hospitals’ efficiency
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Figure 1: PPS distortions by ownership type
28
100%
Upcoding index
80%
100%
Cream skimming index 
60%
80%
60%
20%
40%
20%
40%
0%
Low Intermediate High
0%
Low Intermediate High
80%
100%
Readmission index
60%
20%
40%
0%
Low Intermediate High
>30,000 beds 10,001-30,000 beds 0-10,000 beds
Figure 2: Size distribution of PPS distortions
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Figure 3: Distribution of emergency department in hospitals with high cream
skimming
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1998 2007 Var %
Mean St Dev Min Max Mean St Dev Min Max
Outputs
y∗it 13,356 14,954 567 94,350 17,523 16,523 507 87,250 +31%
DAY S 79,025 86,634 1,178 551,999 60,003 67,443 197 344,161 -24%
DISCH 10,870 1,018 143 86,647 9,524 778 11 48,169 -12%
ALOS 7.50 3.17 3.07 34.42 6.41 3.20 0.96 21.82 -15%
CMI 0.89 0.24 0.59 2.06 1.08 0.25 0.62 2.11 +21%
COMORB 0.20 0.01 0.01 0.67 0.25 0.01 0.01 0.86 28%
Inputs
BEDS 316 320 30 2,030 262 240 15 1,318 -17%
PHY S 140 13 1 808 156 13 3 778 +11%
NURS 360 34 11 1,990 356 32 15 1,891 -1%
ADMIN 246 296 3 1,718 251 285 5 1,399 +2%
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for hospitals in Lombardy, 1998–2007
1998 2007 Var %
Mean St Dev Min Max Mean St Dev Min Max
Outputs
y∗it 17,455 16,626 1,682 94,350 20,235 18,245 507 87,169 +16%
DAY S 110,421 99,832 14,618 551,999 82,773 76,321 4,673 344,161 -25%
DISCH 14,604 13,078 1,671 86,647 12,001 9,803 270 48,169 -18%
ALOS 7.39 1.33 3.07 10.89 6.94 2.30 3.72 21.50 -6%
CMI 0.85 0.15 0.59 1.40 1.01 0.19 0.62 1.62 +18%
COMORB 0.19 0.07 0.02 0.37 0.25 0.13 0.01 0.86 +35%
Inputs
BEDS 427 380 66 2,030 317 282 15 1,318 -26%
PHY S 197 177 7 808 193 182 6 778 -2%
NURS 529 442 35 1,990 495 424 27 1,891 -6%
ADMIN 348 347 24 1,718 331 331 23 1,399 -5%
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for public hospitals in Lombardy, 1998–2007
30
1998 2007 Var %
Mean St Dev Min Max Mean St Dev Min Max
Outputs
y∗it 17,192 18,604 4,294 80,397 27,031 21,222 5,180 87,249 +57%
DAY S 77,190 74,542 16,952 326,718 70,450 63,174 18,166 268,227 -9%
DIS 12,009 13,882 2,022 59,898 12,580 9,990 2,830 42,525 5%
ALOS 7.08 1.61 5.04 9.68 5.75 1.42 2.91 8.66 -19%
CMI 1.15 0.43 0.79 2.06 1.29 0.37 0.85 2.11 +12%
COMORB 0.25 0.13 0.03 0.53 0.28 0.15 0.03 0.53 +9%
Inputs
BEDS 282 224 52 991 341 238 138 1,022 +21%
PHY S 151 167 45 736 197 152 71 662 +30%
NURS 319 314 90 1,390 354 287 111 1,284 +11%
ADMIN 237 249 64 1,078 312 283 84 1,258 +32%
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for NFP hospitals in Lombardy, 1998–2007
1998 2007 Var %
Mean St Dev Min Max Mean St Dev Min Max
Outputs
y∗it 5,599 4,162 567 19,759 10,118 7,298 1,412 31,626 +81%
DAY S 29,801 20,754 1,178 86,283 20,461 20,150 197 94,620 -31%
DIS 4,573 3,660 143 14,990 4,598 4,095 11 19,565 +1%
ALOS 7.79 5.08 3.58 34.42 5.80 4.49 0.96 21.82 -26%
CMI 0.87 0.22 0.66 1.68 1.12 0.25 0.68 1.77 +29%
COMORB 0.19 0.13 0.00 0.67 0.24 0.17 0.00 0.86 +26%
Inputs
BEDS 150 84 30 397 150 76 19 330 0%
PHY S 47 39 1 163 84 61 3 253 +76%
NURS 104 81 11 359 138 102 15 471 +32%
ADMIN 85 65 3 289 105 72 5 354 +24%
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for private hospitals in Lombardy, 1998–2007
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Inputs
Ownership BEDS PHYS NURS ADMIN
NFP BEDS 1 0.93 0.96 0.92
PHYS 1 0.95 0.94
NURS 1 0.93
ADMIN 1
PRI BEDS 1 0.69 0.83 0.78
PHYS 1 0.82 0.77
NURS 1 0.90
ADMIN 1
PUB BEDS 1 0.95 0.96 0.94
PHYS 1 0.97 0.96
NURS 1 0.91
ADMIN 1
Table 6: Pearson inputs correlation by ownership type
Model 1 Model 2
RE TRE RE TRE
Normality Test
Shapiro–Wilk 0.96∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.98∗∗∗
Correlation Test
Durbin–Watson 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10
Homoscedasticity
Levene 0.68 0.35 0.45 0.73
Significance level: ∗∗∗=1%
Table 7: Results of the tests on the residuals: Cobb–Douglas functional form
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Model 1 Model 2
RE TRE RE TRE
Normality Test
Shapiro–Wilk 0.97∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.99∗∗∗
Correlation Test
Durbin–Watson 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.10
Homoscedasticity
Levene 0.83 0.57 0.65 0.77
Significance level: ∗∗∗=1%
Table 8: Results of the tests on the residuals: Translog functional form
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RE TRE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Constant 4.23∗∗∗ 4.35∗∗∗ 4.24∗∗∗ 4.33∗∗∗
(83.83) (78.46) (165.36) (158.06)
BEDS 0.54∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
(51.44) (36.93) (75.54) (70.23)
PHY S 0.05∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
(5.88) (5.25) (10.64) (9.50)
NURS 0.34∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗
(26.58) (22.04) (37.11) (33.24)
ADM 0.09∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(6.64) (8.23) (12.41) (13.89)
EMERG 0.06∗∗∗ 0.04 0.17∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(2.59) (1.77) (18.24) (14.89)
MONO 0.14∗∗∗ 0.08 0.09∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗
(2.50) (1.34) (6.62) (4.56)
TEACH −0.14∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗ −0.09∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(-2.42) (-2.03) (-7.70) (-6.79)
GROUP −0.14∗∗∗ −0.50∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.30∗∗∗
(-14.79) (-12.56) (-38.77) (-38.45)
T 0.04∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(35.58) (32.60) (41.26) (42.70)
UPCOD −0.004∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
(-4.37) (-4.11)
CRSKH −0.11∗∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗
(-4.92) (-8.99)
CRSKM 0.04 0.03
∗∗∗
(1.88) (3.17)
READM 0.04 0.11∗∗∗
(0.67) (3.13)
σ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(12.78) (12.35) (86.91) (70.03)
λ 3.23∗∗∗ 3.31∗∗∗ 2.85∗∗∗ 2.56∗∗∗
(7.01) (6.64) (19.94) (18.31)
LR 595.62 629.43 666.03 698.35
obs. 1340 1340 1340 1340
Student t in parentheses. Significance level: ∗∗∗=1%, ∗∗=5%
Table 9: Cobb–Douglas estimated production function
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RE TRE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Constant 3.51∗∗∗ 3.64∗∗∗ 3.42∗∗∗ 3.58∗∗∗
(15.28) (14.58) (37.08) (36.88)
BEDS 0.76∗∗∗ 0.71∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
-10.20 (9.78) (14.6) (13.09)
PHY S 0.62∗∗∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗
(7.67) (8.41) (15.69) (16.14)
NURS 0.40∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗∗ 0.30∗∗∗
(4.00) (2.60) (6.39) (5.36)
ADM −0.34∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.25∗∗∗
(-3.72) (-3.28) (-5.01) (-4.74)
EMERG 0.09∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(2.68) (2.21) (17.64) (14.93)
MONO 0.17∗∗ 0.06 0.04∗∗∗ 0.002
(2.31) (0.72) (2.79) (0.17)
TEACH 0.10 0.09 0.002 0.001
(1.83) (1.65) (0.15) (0.04)
GROUP −0.43∗∗∗ −0.45∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗ −0.29∗∗∗
(-12.32) (-11.51) (-36.33) (-35.43)
T 0.03∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗
(32.96) (30.85) (36.39) (37.83)
UPC −0.003∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗
(-3.64) (-2.79)
CRSKH −0.08∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(-3.52) (-5.95)
CRSKM 0.04
∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(2.04) (3.40)
READM 0.51∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(8.30) (12.22)
BEDS2 −0.24∗∗∗ −0.22∗∗∗ −0.13∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗
(-5.53) (-5.44)
PHY S2 0.06∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.07∗∗∗
(3.68) (7.32)
NURS2 0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(3.50) (8.13)
ADM2 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 −0.04∗∗∗
(-1.81) (-2.68)
BEDS × PHY S −0.18∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.19∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
(-9.62) (-16.18)
BEDS ×NURS 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗ 0.05∗∗ 0.04
(2.39) (1.93)
BEDS × ADM 0.28∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(11.77) (11.19)
PHY S ×NURS −0.04∗∗ -0.03 −0.09∗∗∗ −0.08∗∗∗
(-1.73) (-5.81)
PHY S × ADM 0.07∗∗∗ 0.06∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(3.58) (9.83)
NURS × ADM −0.21∗∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗
(-5.07) (-9.40)
σ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(10.54) (5.72) (70.33) (58)
λ 3.45∗∗∗ 3.30∗∗∗ 2.64∗∗∗ 2.53∗∗∗
(5.53) (10.74) (16.78) (14.97)
LR 667.03 697.30 726.99 753.20
obs. 1,340 1,340 1,340 1,340
Student t in parentheses. Significance level: ∗∗∗=1%, ∗∗=5%
Table 10: Translog estimated production function
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Ownership
NFP PUB PRI
Output per BEDS 80 63 62
Output per PHYS 140 115 162
Output per NURS 76 40 76
Output per ADM 89 66 116
4 PHYS/BEDS +7.8% +32% +79%
4 NURS/BEDS -8.3% +23% +33%
4 ADM/BEDS +8.9% +28% +24%
Table 11: Partial productivity measures (year 2007) and 1998/2007 changes
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Ownership RE TRE
Average 1998 2007
Not–for–profit 0.73 0.86 0.87
Private 0.68 0.78 0.85
Public 0.76 0.87 0.87
Kruskal–Wallis tests
RE model
Hypothesis P–value Critical value Decision
TEPRI = TENFP 0.51 0.05 Accepted
TEPRI = TEPUB 0.003 0.05 Rejected
TEPUB = TENFP 0.53 0.05 Accepted
TRE model–year 1998
Hypothesis P–value Critical value Decision
TEPRI = TENFP 0.03 0.05 Rejected
TEPRI = TEPUB 0.00 0.05 Rejected
TEPUB = TENFP 0.52 0.05 Accepted
TRE model–year 2007
Hypothesis P–value Critical value Decision
TEPRI = TENFP 0.85 0.05 Accepted
TEPRI = TEPUB 0.18 0.05 Accepted
TEPUB = TENFP 0.20 0.05 Accepted
Table 12: Average efficiency scores and Kruskal–Wallis test significance for
ownership types
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